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1 U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001: El Salvador, March 4,
2002.
2 Article 204 of the Labor Code states, “Tienen el derecho de asociarse para defender sus intreses
economicos y sociales comunes, formando asociaciones profesionales o sindicatos, sin distincion
de nacionalidad, sexo, razo, credo o ideas políticas, las siguentes personas: a) los patronos y
trabajadores privados; b) los trajabadores de las instituciones oficiales autónomas.
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Written Testimony Regarding the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
Prepared by the International Labor Rights Fund
The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) is deeply concerned about ongoing labor
rights violations in Central America. The current, neo-liberal economic model forces developing
countries to compete against one another to attract new investment by offering low wages and
foregoing enforcement of labor and environmental laws.  Indeed, such competition is the greatest
barrier to the enforcement of labor laws, as countries legitimately fear that multinationals will
move to the country offering the greatest freedom to operate with impunity from national law. 
To solve this difficult problem, CAFTA must include a clause that would incorporate substantive
labor standards and an enforcement mechanism that encourages local enforcement, but provides
remedies in the event of systematic noncompliance.  As we have learned from past experience,
unless CAFTA includes such mechanisms, current violations of core labor standards, as
described below, will continue unabated.
As you will see from the following country profiles, not one country even closely
complies with internationally recognized worker rights.  To overcome this complex problem, we
have set forth a list of considerations that must be addressed directly and seriously during the
upcoming negotiations.  Specific language will follow shortly, once we have had an opportunity
to discuss fully these issues with our partners in the United States and Central America.  
COUNTRY PROFILES
I. EL SALVADOR
A. Freedom of Association
Although El Salvador has not ratified ILO Convention 87, it is bound as a member of the
ILO to uphold worker’s freedom of association under the Article 2 of the ILO’s 1998
Declaration of the Principles and Rights at Work.  As the U.S. State Department has notes, both
the Constitution of El Salvador and the Labor Code permit workers and employers to form
unions or associations.  Moreover, the law prohibits anti-union activity before a union is
registered legally and prohibits the dismissal of workers whose names appear on a union
application.  However, the ILO has routinely found that the labor code impermissibly restricts
workers’ freedom of association.1  For example, only private sector workers and some
employees of autonomous public agencies have the right to form unions.2  Public sector workers
are prohibited from forming unions, although they are allowed to form professional and
employee organizations.  The government has justified this exclusion on the basis that civil
3 Article 529 of the Labor Code provides in part “Si la huelga fuese decidida por la mayoria de
los trabajadores de la empresa o establecimiento que estuviese afectado por el conflicto, tal
decision obligara a todo el personal.”
4 Article 528 of the Labor Code provides “Las huelgas que reconoce este ‘odigo, para efectos
laborales, unicamente serán aquellas que tengan cualquiera de las siguentes finalidades: 1) la
celebración o revisión del contracto colectivo de trabajo; 2) la celebración o revisión de la
convención colectiva de trabajo; y 3) la defensa de los intereses profesionales comunes de los
trabajadores.”
5 See Articles 480 et seq. of the Labor Code.
6 Article 530 of the Labor Code provides, in part “La huelga no podrá estallar antes de haber
transcurrido cuatro dias contados a partir de la fecha de la notificación a que se refiere el artículo
anterior …”
7 See Complaint against the Government of El Salvador presented by the Trade Union Federation
of Food Sector and Allied Workers (FESTSA), the Company Union of Workers of Doall
Enterprises S.A. (SETDESA) and the Ministry of Education Workers' Union (ATRAMEC)
Report No. 323, Case(s) No(s). 2085.
8 Id. at ¶ 172.
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servants provide essential services.  However, among those workers who may form unions, the
Code erects procedural obstacles that make registration and recognition of the union difficult. 
The law also erects significant barriers to the right to strike, including a requirement that
51% of workers in an enterprise, whether or not they are union members, support the strike.3  A
strike can only be called if it concerns a change or renewal of a collective agreement or
maintaining the workers’ professional interests.4  Additionally, unions may only strike after the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and must first seek to resolve any differences
through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration before initiating a strike.5 Once a union decides
to strike, however, the union must first name a strike committee to serve as a negotiator and send
the list of participants to the Ministry of Labor, who then notifies the employer.  The union must
then wait four more days from the time the Ministry notifies the employer before beginning the
strike.6  It is therefore not surprising that there have been no significant strikes recently.
In recent years, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association has supported
complaints filed by Salvadoran unions alleging violations of freedom of association.  In 2000,
the ILO determined that El Salvador had violated the rights of several unions to freely associate
either by means of excessive formalisms or exclusions for public sector workers.7  For example,
the ILO criticized the government’s decision to deny the application of five food industry unions to form
a federation, the Trade Union Federation of Food Sector and Allied Workers (FESTSA). The ILO found
that “although the founders of a trade union should comply with the formalities prescribed by legislation,
those formalities should not be of such a nature as to impair the free establishm ent of organizations.”8 
9 Id. at ¶ 173.
10 Id.
11 Id. at ¶ 174
12 See ICFTU 2002 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: El Salvador; U.S. Dept.
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001: El Salvador, March 4, 2002.
13  See Informe del Monitoreo de las Maquilas y Recintos Fiscales: Unidad de Monitoreo y
Analisis de las Relaciones Laboral, Julio 2000, available at http://www.nlcnet.org/elsalvador/
0401/arlcover.htm.
14 Id. at 17.
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The ILO held that the government should have asked the federation to submit the missing information
rather than to  deny recognition. 
In the same opinion, the ILO also castigated El Salvador for its refusal to grant legal
personality to the Ministry of Education Workers' Union (ATRAMEC) in May 2000.  The
government had refused to recognize the union on the basis that its members were employed in
the public sector.  The Committee rejected that view, holding that “the denial of the right of
association of public service employees to establish unions is an extremely serious violation of
the most elementary principles of freedom of association.”9 Consequently, the Committee urged the
Government “as a matter of urgency to ensure that the national legislation of El Salvador is amended in
such a way that it recognizes the right of association of public service employees.”10
The ILO also supported a complaint by the Company Union of Workers of Doall
Enterprises S.A. (SETDESA), who was denied recognition as a union by the government. In its
defense, the government claimed that it would not recognize the union because, one hour before
the foundation of the union, the founders had resigned, the workers who had attempted to
establish the union were subsequently reinstated, and other workers established a different union
which was granted recognition.  Upon reviewing the facts, the Committee rejected the
government’s excuses and “express[ed] its profound regret at the anti-union acts of
discrimination and interference on the part of the company.”11 
The freedom to associate and form a union continues to remain elusive to many workers
in El Salvador.  For example, on June 9, 2001, workers at AMITEX S.A. established the Amitex
workers’ union, SITIASA. Three days later, the union submitted documents for its legal
registration.  However, the company responded by firing 87 union workers. Once the Labor
Ministry intervened, it merely converted the dismissals to suspensions.12 
A.1 The Maquila Sector
In 2000, the Ministry of Labor of El Salvador issued a report assessing the level of labor
rights compliance in the maquila sector.13  The authors of that report found the rate of
unionization in the maquila sector was, and continues to be, very low and that in the majority of
companies, union organization does not exist.14  The reasons cited for the low level of
15 Id.
16  Information regarding the mass dismissal of union members at the national airport was drawn
from numerous sources, including the ILO CFA Report No. 328, Case No. 2165, ICFTU, Global
Report 2002 and U.S. State Department Country Report 2002 – El Salvador.
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unionization was the existence of an anti-union policy, by which any attempt at organization was
repressed.15  According to union leaders interviewed, it was very common for supervisors and
other management representatives to threaten workers with firing if they belonged to a union or
attempted to form one.  The workers stated that one of the principal anti-union policies consist in
the maintenance of "blacklists" of the names of workers who at some time belonged to a union.
The workers affirm that people who appear on these blacklists are not hired in the maquila
sector, which constitutes a flagrant violation of their freedom of association.
B. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
As the U.S. State Department noted in the 2002 country practices report, the Constitution
and the Labor Code provide for collective bargaining rights for employees in the private sector
and for certain categories of workers in autonomous government agencies.  Additionally, the
Constitution prohibits discrimination against unions and also provides that union officials at the
time of their election, throughout their term, and for one year following their term may not be
fired, suspended, removed, or demoted except for legal cause.  However, the Labor Code does
not require the employers to reinstate them, but rather requires the employers to provide a
severance payment. In practice, employers dismiss workers who seek to form unions; the
Government typically does not prevent their dismissal or require their reinstatement but may
ensure that the severance is paid.  Moreover, the ILO has reported instances of employers using
illegal pressure to discourage organizing, including the dismissal of labor activists and the
maintenance of lists of workers who would not be hired because they had belonged to unions.
  
B1. Structural Impediments to the Enforcement of the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively
The Ministry of Labor monitors the implementation of collective bargaining agreements
and mediates in labor disputes where bargaining is permitted.  However, the Ministry often seeks
to conciliate labor disputes through informal channels rather than attempt to enforce regulations
strictly, often to the detriment of labor.  Moreover, the U.S. State Department noted that
corruption among labor inspectors and in the labor courts is a problem. In fact, the Labor
Ministry removed from their positions five inspectors who had been accepting bribes from
companies in June of 2001.
B2. Violations of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively  
(Non – Maquila)
Of the numerous violations of the right to organize and bargain collectively in the past
year, the militarization of the national airport represents perhaps the most egregious case outside
of the maquila sector.16  On September 23, 2001, the armed forces of El Salvador, in conjunction
5with riot police from the National Civil Police, burst into the El Salvador International Airport
and ordered the workers, many of whom were represented by the union, to leave the terminal on
the explanation that they had been dismissed.  The following day, the same forces prevented
workers of the cargo and maintenance departments, all of whom were members of the El
Salvador International Airport Workers' Union (SITEAIES), affiliated to FESTRASPES, from
entering the airport.  Subsequently, the military personnel in charge informed the workers that
only those from the maintenance department could enter the premises, and that the other 159
members of the cargo and security departments had been dismissed.  According to
FESTRASPES, all of the workers affected were members of SITEAIES.
The airport administration attempted to force workers to withdraw from the union, and
informed all of those who had been suspended that they had now been dismissed.  They also
tried to eject four union leaders, who enjoyed trade union immunity under the labor code.  At the
request of the union, the Ministry of Labor carried out an inspection and found a series of labor
rights violations, including anti-union discrimination through the restriction of access to union
premises and threats to trade union leaders.  At the same time, the union lodged a complaint with
the judicial authorities, with the hope of achieving a ruling that the lockout was illegal. 
However, the judge ruled that no lockout had occurred, and the Court of Appeal rejected the
subsequent appeal.  A complaint was also filed with the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of
Association, who asked the government to investigate and reinstate all workers fired for union
activities.  Early this year, over 60 of the baggage handlers returned to work as independent
contractors to the airport.  The conditions of employment, including the rate of pay, is, however,
less than the previously received. 
Additionally, the Workers' Union of the National Institute for Public Employees'
Pensions (SITINPEP) alleged that on 21 December 2001, a total of 92 workers, 56 of whom
were members of the union, were dismissed from the National Institute for Public Employees'
Pensions (INPEP).  Of the 56 members of the union, three were federal leaders enjoying trade
union immunity.  When presented with these facts, the ILO’s CFA determined that the
Government should have consulted tried to reach an agreement with the trade union
organizations regarding staff reductions.  The Committee also noted that over half of the workers
dismissed were members of the union, and that 24 of them were workers' representatives in
various commissions and committees. The Committee “requested that the Government take the
necessary measures urgently to ensure that an investigation is carried out to determine the
reasons why such a high proportion of unionists were dismissed and, if it transpires that any of
these dismissals were due to the worker's trade union membership or legitimate union activities,
that it takes the necessary measures urgently to ensure the reinstatement of those workers in their
jobs without loss of pay.” 
B.3. Violation of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 
(Maquila Sector)
There are approximately 220 maquila factories, the majority of which are located in the
country's 11 EPZ's.  Although the Labor Code applies in the EPZ's, enforcement of those laws is
infrequent at best.  Indeed, Labor Ministry, in a 2000 report described what it called the
systematic violation of workers' efforts to form unions as well as safety problems and mandatory
6overtime policies.  The report, undertaken in El Salvador’s four largest export processing zones,
San Marcos, San Bartolo, American Park and El Pedregal, found that there was a clear anti-
union policy in the maquilas, whereby any attempt at organizing was repressed.  Union leaders
interviewed said it was very common for supervisors to threaten workers with dismissal if they
joined or attempted to form a union. The report further noted that none of the 229 maquilas had a
union contract.  Many of the workers interviewed told Labor Ministry officials that the union
supporters were blacklisted to ensure they did not get jobs.
Perhaps the most significant violation of the right to organize and bargain collectively in
2001-2002 occurred at the TS2 factory, owned by the Taiwan based multinational, Tainan
Enterprises.  In 2000, workers began to organize a unit of STIT, the textile workers union of El
Salvador.  The workers suffered a number of anti-union measures at this time, including the
suspension of two union leaders on February 26, 2001, when they denounced the company’s
decision to force the workers to continue working through the earthquakes of early 2001. 
Despite the anti-union reprisals, a unit of STIT was organized at Tainan during the visit of
Tainan President Chen Shui-Bian on May 23, 2001; the union received legal status as a union
from the Labor Ministry that July.   
On August 26, 2001, STIT attempted to organize its first strike, based on Tainan’s threat
to suspend several of the workers, the majority of whom were union members.  Tainan followed
through with its threat on October 17, 2001, when it suspended 109 workers, most of whom were
union members.  However, as a result of the threat of a major campaign against GAP by U.S.
based labor organizations and NGO’s, Tainan signed an accord with STIT in November 2001 to
return the suspended workers. 
In March 2002, STIT launched an effort to sign up workers in order to reach the numbers
needed to demand collective bargaining agreements.  However, the plant manager threatened
more suspensions, arguing that labels such as the Gap were not placing orders due to the labor
unrest.  Upon reaching the legal minimum to bargain collectively, the union filed a request with
the Labor Minister to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement on April 18.  On the following
day, however, delegates attending a meeting with representatives of Tainan Enterprises in
Taiwan were informed that the factory would be closed, albeit temporarily.  However,
management began to dismantle the machinery in the factory the following week.  To date,
Tainan has refused to accept the union’s demand to reopen the factory despite a recent ruling by
a labor court in El Salvador finding that the company’s suspension of the workers’ contracts was
illegal.
C. Forced or Compulsory Labor
Traffic of children is prohibited under ILO Convention 182, Article 3 ¶ (a) & (b), which
prohibit “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of
children” and “the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography or for pornographic performances.”  Although El Salvador ratified Convention 182
on October 12, 2000, it is alone among its neighbors in Central America in that it has no penal
17 International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law, In Modern
Bondage: Sex Trafficking in the Americas, October 2002.
18  Article 116 of the Labor Code states, in part “La journada de los menores de dieciseis años, no
podra ser mayor de seis horas diarias y de treinte y cuatro emenales, en cualquier clase de
trabajo. “
 
19 Article 105 of the Labor Code states, in part “Se prohibe el trabajo de los menores de
dieciocho años en labores peligrosas o insalubres.”
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legislation specifically prohibiting the trafficking of women or children for sexual exploitation.17 
Some traffickers have been prosecuted in the rare case, however, under anti-smuggling legislation. 
Trafficking of women and children continues to be a problem, despite its commitments to the ILO to the
contrary.  
According to the State Department’s 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices
and the recent International Human Rights Law Institute report, women and children are
trafficked into El Salvador from Nicaragua and Honduras and are trafficked from El Salvador to
Guatemala and Mexico.  The most common methods used to approach victims of sex trafficking
are kidnapping, promises of lucrative job offers, and inducement into prostitution by friends.  In
some instances, Salvadoran women and children are lured to Mexico by procurers and are
thereafter sold into bonded labor to owners of establishments who force the trafficked persons to
work off their debt as prostitutes.  Street children from El Salvador are also lured into border
areas with Guatemala where they are then forced into prostitution by organized crime rings.
Moreover, females between the ages 14 to 19 are trafficked within El Salvador for the purpose of
sexual exploitation.
D. Child Labor
ILO Convention 138, Article 4, ¶ 3 mandates a minimum age of 15.  However, under
Article 4, ¶ 4, a country “whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed
may, after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers concerned, where such
exist, initially specify a minimum age of 14 years.” Therefore, if El Salvador has acted in
accordance with ¶ 4, the law of El Salvador, as described below, complies with the convention’s
minimum standards.
Article 38 of the Constitution specifically provides that no child fourteen years of age or
younger is permitted to work unless necessary to provide for the basic needs of the family.  Even
in such cases, a child’s work cannot impede the completion of his or her obligatory education. 
Moreover, children of 15 or 16 years of age can work no more than six hours a day or more than
34 hours in a week.18 Additionally, children younger than 18 years of age may not engage in
dangerous work or during the night, with few exceptions.19 
 
Despite the legal prohibition on child labor, however, the ILO documented widespread
child labor in various sectors of the Salvadoran economy, and in some cases in its worst forms. 
The ILO estimates that there are 447,782 minors (7% of the total population) engaged in some
20 See ILO-IPEC, El Salvador: Trabajo Infantil en Los Trabajos Domésticos, Feb. 2002, p. 19. 
21 Id. at pp. 19 -36.
22 See ILO-IPEC, El Salvador, Trabajo Infantil en la Cana de Azucar, Feb. 2002, pp. 19 -40.
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form of child labor.20  Such labor includes domestic work, sugar cane cutting and harvesting, fishing,
sorting garbage or various forms of street work.  In most cases, the health, welfare and education of the
children engaged in such work are severely comprom ised.  A review of the conditions of work in
dom estic labor and cane cutting, for example, provide a rather stunning illustration of the effects of child
labor on the children of El Salvador.
D.1. Domestic Employment21
According to the ILO, 19% of the 21,508 children performing domestic service in El
Salvador are between 10 and 14 years of age, with the remaining 81% between the ages of 14
and 19.  However, children often enter the world of domestic work between 9 and 12 years of
age.  As such, these children are responsible for washing clothes, ironing, housecleaning,
cooking and serving food, watching children, attending to the aged or incapacitated or other
similarly arduous tasks.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the children engaged in this work
quickly suffer physically, psychologically and socially.
As part of the investigation, the ILO researchers interviewed 110 children to obtain data
on quality of life issues, including level of education, health and conditions of work.  The ILO
found that only 34 of the 110 children interviewed attended school and, of these, only 25
attended with regularity.  The principle reason for non-attendance was that the work hours are
typically the same time as school hours.  Additionally, in some cases, children were unable to
pay for their school uniforms, transportation and other required costs or fees.
Children also reported chronic fatigue and pain in their limbs, shoulders and head. 
Moreover, many children contracted viral infections and bacteria from contact with laundry and
cleaning detergents, disinfectants and other solutions.  Still others developed allergic reactions
on their skin, eyes or respiratory systems.  Over half of the children surveyed also showed signs
of moderate malnutrition, which leads to greater incidence of disease and fatigue.  In addition to
these workplace health and safety concerns, many children were also physically and mentally
abused.  Many reported frequent beatings by their employer, by hand, with shoes or kitchen
implements.  Similarly, the children receive frequent insults and threats.  Many young girls are
also the victims of sexually abuse by their male employers.
D.2. Sugar Cane Harvesting22
Of all the forms of child labor in El Salvador investigated by the ILO, sugar cane
harvesting exemplifies child labor in its worst forms.  As set forth in ILO Convention 182,
Articles 2 and 3, no person under the age of 18 may perform work “which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of
children.”  
23 Article 161 of the Labor Code provides “La semana laboral diurna no excederá de cuarenta y
cuatro horas ni la nocturna de trienta y nueve.”
24 Article 169 of the Labor Code provides “Todo trabajo verificado en exceso de la jornada
ordinaria, será remunerado con un recargo consistente en el ciento por ciento del salario básico
por hora, hasta la límite legal.
25 Article 171 of the Labor Code provides “Todo trabajador tiene derecho a un dia de descanso
remunerado por cada semana laboral.”
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Using 1999 data, the ILO reported that 47.1% of the 233,700 boys and 185,000 engaged
in some form of labor worked in the agricultural sector.  Indeed, of the producers consulted for
the report, 27 to 30 of each 100 workers in the fields are children, figures that include children
who accompany their parents to assist them with various aspects of production. Of the children
interviewed, 68.5% were between the ages of 7 and 14, the majority entering such work between
the ages of 7 and 10. The average day for these children begins at 6 am and ends between 12 and
4 p.m., with a daily salary of about $3.20 per day.
Boys are primarily responsible for cutting or burning cane, which involves the use of
dangerous instruments such as curved knives, machetes, hoes, shovels, hooks and fumigation
equipment.  The hands and arms of the majority of boys are covered with cuts and bruises. 
Others have suffered more serious injuries, usually with machetes, requiring several days to
recuperate from the cuts. Additional hazards include prolonged exposure to the sun and the
inhalation of ash from the burning cane.  Both of these hazards increase the risk of deadly
cancer, the former causing various degrees of skin cancer and the later lung cancer. 
E. Acceptable Conditions of Work
E.1. Minimum Wages
According to the State Department’s 2002 report for El Salvador, the minimum wage is
set by executive decree based on recommendations from a tripartite committee. The minimum
daily wage is $4.80 for commercial, industrial, construction, and service employees, $2.47 for
agricultural workers and $3.57 for seasonal agriculture industry workers.  This wage, with
benefits, does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. 
E.2. Hours of Work
The law sets a maximum normal workweek of 44 hours.23  It limits the workweek to no
more than 6 days for all workers and requires 100% bonus pay for all overtime.24  Additionally, a
full-time employee is paid for an 8-hour day of rest in addition to the normal workweek.25 
However, many workers worked hours beyond the legal maximum and were not paid the
required overtime, particularly in the maquila sector.
26  Ministry of Labor, supra n. 13, at 12.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 10.
29 Id. at 10-11.
30 Id. at 9.
31 Id.  at 7 – 8.
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The Ministry of Labor reported that overtime is worked in the majority of maquila
companies in order to complete production goals established by the company.26  In some cases,
overtime was not paid or workers did not receive the 25 percent legal premium for night hours. 
The Ministry further found that in the majority of companies, personnel are required to work
overtime under the threat of firing or some other reprisal.27  In addition to threatening the health
of the workers, this exacerbates family problems.  Additionally, the majority of workers stated
that even when they received remuneration for overtime, the wage was insufficient to satisfy
their family needs with dignity.
E.3. Occupational Safety and Health
The Constitution and the Labor Code require employers, including the Government, to
take steps to ensure the safety of their employees while at work.  However, due to its limited
mandate and resources, the Ministry of Labor has not been able to adequately enforce the
applicable workplace regulations.  Indeed, as set forth in the Labor Ministry report, the
conditions in the maquilas fall below minimum safety and health standards.  For example,
workers reported that they did not receive safety equipment appropriate for their work, such as
masks, gloves, respirators and other necessary equipment.28  Additionally, the physical working
environment is usually characterized by excessive heat and poor ventilation, producing stress, fatigue and
illness that may become chronic.29  Other hazards include the poorly maintained machines that workers
frequently attempt to repair in order to prevent work stoppage. Often times, these workers are injured in
the process.30  Unhealthy drinking water and cafeteria conditions have lead to some illness requiring visits
to health clinics.31
II. GUATEMALA
32 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002 – Guatemala, p. 5.
33 MINUGUA, Report for the Consultative Group meeting for Guatemala, Jan. 18, 2002, p. 12.
34 ICFTU Report for the WTO General Council Review of Trade Policies of Guatemala (Jan.
2002), p. 2.
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The U.S. Trade Representative ended the last worker rights review on Guatemala in May
2001, concluding that the labor code reforms passed by the Guatemalan government in April and
May represented a significant effort to strengthen protections for worker rights.  The USTR also
cited the reinstatement of illegally dismissed banana workers as justification for ending the GSP
review, although the reinstatement of the workers was the result of a negotiated settlement
between workers and management, not governmental intervention.32
A year and a half after the completion of the last USTR review, the 2001 labor code
reforms have yet to be fully enacted and serious violations of worker rights continue.  Indeed,
the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) stated in February that “there is a
glaring disproportion between the magnitude and complexity of the country’s labor problems
and the human and material resources allocated by the State to overcoming them and the low
priority assigned to labor issues in political decision-making.”33 
A. 2001 Labor Code Reforms Are Insufficient and Underutilized
The labor code reforms passed in 2001 did not bring Guatemala’s labor practices up to
acceptable standards.  While the reforms did commit the country to making some important
improvements, not all have been carried out. For example, the May 2001 reforms gave the
Ministry of Labor a new power to levy fines for labor rights violations (Article 16, Decree 18-
2001).  At the time, this appeared to be a positive step toward improving labor law enforcement
and encouraging compliance.  However, this new power has yet to be used.  
Moreover, the 2001 reforms still do not meet ILO standards in several key areas.  For
example, the reforms failed to ease unacceptable restrictions on public sector employees’ right to
strike.  Also, they require that 50% plus one of the workforce in an entire industry sign up in
order to form a new union, a minimum that makes union formation in the industrial sector
virtually impossible. See Article 7, Decree 13-2001.  The ILO Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has also expressed their concern
and asked for the clarification of provisions that give the President unilateral discretion to end
strikes, see Article 13, Decree 18-2001, and that require trade union officers to be Guatemalan
citizens.34
B. Labor Courts Fail to Protect the Rights of Workers 
The state of the Guatemalan labor courts is particularly troubling.  The labor courts are
weak, proceed slowly, and fail to enforce their rulings and thus do not effectively protect the
35 MINUGUA, supra n. 33.
36 NISGUA (http://www.nisgua.org/articles/sitrabi%20trial.htm).
37 Jacky Delorme, “Anti-union bananas,” ICFTU Online, 10/29/99 (http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/112.html).
38 http://www.rtfcam.org/report/volume_20/No_4/article_13.htm.
39 ICFTU Report for the WTO, supra n. 34.
40 Human Rights Watch, supra n. 32.
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rights of workers or remedy the worker who has been treated unjustly.  Perpetrators of violence
against trade unionists also continue to enjoy impunity, as documented in a February 2002 report
published by MINUGUA that meticulously described the Guatemalan government’s failure to
address key portions of the Peace Accords.  Indeed, the UN noted that Guatemala had failed to
protect human rights or undertake judicial reform and further observed that impunity is an
“entrenched phenomenon” and “the main obstacle to the effective enjoyment of human rights” in
Guatemala.35 
B.1.  SITRABI
The experience of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izbal (SITRABI), a union
representing banana workers at Fresh Del Monte, illustrates the continuing problem of impunity
in Guatemala.  In 1999, Del Monte’s subsidiary fired 918 banana workers in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement.  In October of that same year, over 200 armed men attacked
SITRABI in their union hall.36  Five SITRABI leaders were held at gunpoint, instructed to quit
the union and their jobs, and ordered to call off a planned work stoppage over the local radio,
which had been organized to protest of the firings. The police did not investigate, even though
the union offices are less than 300 meters from the central police station at Morales, numerous
vehicles were at the site and armed men were patrolling the vicinity.37  Indeed, MINUGUA
called the SITRABI case the second worst violation of human rights since the beginning of the
Guatemalan peace process.
On June 6, 2000, a court judge in Puerto Barrios refused to charge the perpetrators with
kidnapping and dropped all charges against five of the thirty defendants, leaving only 25 of the
44 people accused by SITRABI faced with criminal charges.38  In March 2002, 24 men were
finally brought to trial but were tried for the lesser charges of coercion and illegal detention. 
During the proceedings, armed men waited outside the courthouse while people left the court,
intimidating witnesses and workers.39  In the end, 22 defendants received 3.5-year prison
sentences that were commuted upon payment of fines.  The perpetrators, therefore, spent no time
in jail.  The union leaders and their families remain in forced exile and unable to return home.40 
Presently, several former union members are subsistence farming and continue to be terrorized
and even murdered by the same thugs that attacked the union offices in 1999.  Eyewitness
testimony links Obdulio Mendoza Matta, one of the leaders of the attack on the union and a
known narco-trafficker, to the murder of at least one of the union members.  On November 1,
2002, two more were murdered, this time by an armed man who shot into the workers’ camp
41  Information gathered by Jeff Vogt, Assistant General Counsel, International Labor Rights
Fund, through the course of interviews with former Del Monte workers during a visit in October
2002, and by subsequent correspondence. 
 
42 Human Rights Watch, supra n. 32.
43 COVERCO Special Report, Liz Claiborne International’s Standards of Engagement and the
Unionization of Two Supplier Factories in Guatemala, August 2001.
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from his motorcycle.41  These events clearly demonstrate the failure of the authorities to take
strong action against anti-union violence.
C. Freedom of Association
Guatemala has a particularly low rate of unionization.  In fact, less than 3% of the
Guatemalan labor force is unionized, and most members are in the private sector.  However,
employers in the public sector were among the worst violators of the right of association, as
reported by MINUGUA in September 2001.  In the worst cases, workers who decide to join
unions cannot even be assured that they will be free to live.  In December 2001, for example,
Baudillo Armado Cermeño, the organizing secretary of the Luz y Fuerza (SLF) electricity
workers’ union, was assassinated.  Several months earlier, armed men raided the SLF offices;
neither incident was investigated by the police or human rights authorities.42
Employers have also begun to set up “solidarity associations” as a more compliant
alternative to unions.  As solidarity associations do not have the right to strike or to bargain
collectively, they do not meet the requirements of “free association” as defined by the ILO. 
Although unions and solidarity associations supposedly coexist in the same company or factory,
in practice many employers encourage membership in solidarity associations as an alternative to
the unions and foster a competitive relationship between them.  
Strikes are still prohibited in the health, transport and energy sectors, on the basis that
such services are “essential;” however, these jobs are not within the ILO’s accepted definition of
essential services, where it may be justifiable to restrict the right to strike. Rather, the ILO
defines essential services to be those “the interruption of which may endanger the life, personal
safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”  See General Survey, ¶159.  Moreover,
the President of Guatemala has the power to intervene and declare strikes in the banana, coffee
or sugar industries to be illegal because they could injure fundamental economic activities. This
too is incompatible with ILO jurisprudence regarding workers’ right to strike. 
C.1. The Choi Shin/CIMA Case
Events in Choi Shin and CIMA Textiles, related Korean companies that share production
facilities in Villa Nueva, provide a clear example of the use of solidarity associations and
intimidation to restrict the right to association.  In July 2001, the two unions representing the
workers at these factories registered themselves with the Guatemalan government and asked the
5th Labor Court to declare “employment immobility,” meaning that the court would have to
approve all future firings and resignations.  On the same day, lawyers representing VESTEX, the
textile and apparel producers association, visited all of the workers and offered them an
alternative membership in a management-supported solidarity association.43 Managers further
44 Id.
45 ICFTU Report for the WTO, supra n. 34, p. 4.
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tried to discourage union participation by threatening to close the factories and encouraging
union opponents to identify union workers and demand their resignation.  
When violent conflicts erupted in the factory, management claimed that they could not
control the actions of the anti-union group and thus allowed them to continue the persecution of
the union supporters.  COVERCO, an independent monitoring group, noted that “senior and
middle management…were slow to contact local police and chose not to hire additional
uniformed security agents to stabilize the situation in the factories.”44  Seven union members
were forced to resign from work, in direct violation of the “employment immobility” order. 
Other unionists did not even enter the factory because they legitimately feared for their safety. 
Again, COVERCO observed “that anti-union workers and some members of management
subjected those who had publicly identified themselves as union members to physical and verbal
abuse, as well as psychological harassment.”  During the days of most intense conflict, both the
unions and managers asked the Ministry of Labor to visit the factories, which it did not do. 
When a labor inspector did come days later to meet with the factory managers, union
representatives were not invited to attend.
The Ministry of Labor finally recognized the union later that July and arranged a meeting
between the unions and the management to resolve the conflict.  This only happened after the
AFL-CIO requested a review of Guatemala’s trade preferences, indicating the important role that
USTR reviews can play in promoting labor rights.  The fired workers were reinstated, but they
were not immediately returned to their original posts, as required by Article 20 of the Labor
Code.  The ICFTU has also noted that “trade union members in these factories still face
discrimination, and there is still not a collective agreement”.45  While the 2001 worker rights
review encouraged recognition of these unions, it did not lead to permanent changes in terms of
respect for worker rights.
46 Human Rights Watch, From the Household to the Factory: Sex Discrimination in the
Guatemalan Labor Force, Jan. 2002.
47 US/LEAP Report, Sept. 2002 (http://www.usleap.org/STECSAAlert9-3-02.html).
48 ICFTU Report for the WTO, supra n. 34, p. 4.
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D. Right to Organize and Bargaining Collectively
Under Guatemalan law, one-fourth of the workers in a factory or business must be union
members for collective bargaining to take place.  Low levels of unionization, along with
management's aversion to sharing power with workers, therefore limit the practice of collective
bargaining.  Most workers, even those organized in trade unions, do not have collective contracts
documenting their wages and working conditions, nor do they have individual contracts as
required by law.  A November 2000 study by the Association for Research and Social Studies
found that only 10 percent of workers have a contract registered with the Labor Ministry as
required by law. Even where workers have a binding collective bargaining agreement, the
management sometimes chooses to ignore selected provisions.  
Furthermore, labor law enforcement is very weak in the export processing zones.  Indeed,
only one union is currently organizing in the maquilas, and none of the maquilas have collective
bargaining agreements.  Employers in the maquila sector frequently use intimidation, mass
dismissals, and plant closings to discourage unionization.46
D.1. The PANAMCO Case
In February 2001, workers belonging to the STECSA union began negotiating a new
contract with their employer, PANAMCO, a Coca-Cola bottler.  During the negotiations,
PANAMCO attempted to introduce proposals that would reduce rights and benefits, reduce job
stability and hinder the processes established to solve problems in the workplace.  Each of these
proposals violate Section 106 of the Guatemalan Constitution and Section 12 of the Labor
Code.47  Management has also been intimidating workers through illegal salary reductions and
wage suspensions, and by neglecting machinery maintenance.  The workers still do not have a
new contract and PANAMCO has since filed a suit in court to attempt to deny the union’s legal
right to strike in order give the company even more leverage.
E. Conditions of Work
E.1. Sex Discrimination in the Export Processing Zones
Discrimination on the basis of sex is also a serious problem in the maquila sector.  The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) notes that “discrimination in
employment…is especially clear concerning the women workers who constitute the majority of
the workforce in the maquiladoras.  Sexual harassment and physical abuse are common, women
workers are almost exclusively not unionized [due to] intimidation and threats of reprisal from
employers, and working conditions are generally bad.”48




Article 151 of the Labor Code prohibits employers from specifying sex, race, ethnicity,
or civil status in job announcements and from differentiating between single and married women
and/or women with family responsibilities.  The Labor Ministry has interpreted Article 151 to
also prohibit pregnancy questioning or testing as a condition for employment, stating “Given that
rights and obligations inherent to the working woman derive from pregnancy and maternity,
which the State protects and whose strict enforcement [the state] ensures in a special manner,
every act or document through which an applicant for a job is required whether she is pregnant
[sic] or that intends to give her an exam related to that status, are nulos ipso jue and do not
obligate those applicants [to comply]”.49  However, women who apply for jobs in the maquila
sector are routinely questioned about their pregnancy status, and are often required to have
pregnancy exams.  Indeed, COVERCO has cited cases where women were required to sign a
pledge on their job application to stop having children.50  
A 2002 Human Rights Watch study of the maquila sector also found widespread sex
discrimination, pregnancy testing, illegal dismissals of pregnant workers, and failure to enforce
maternity protections.51  The experience of Lourdes López, one of the women interviewed for the
study, was typical.  Ms. López had applied three times to work at Internacional de Alimentos
Procesados S.A., a food processing and freezing plant, and once at Dong Bang Fashions S.A., a
textile maquila, between 1989 and 1998.  In all four interviews she was asked whether or not she
was pregnant, and once she was required to give a urine sample for a pregnancy test.
The Human Rights Watch study also found that many maquila workers are not registered
for health care even though the maquila management is deducting the Guatemalan Institute for
Social Security (IGSS) contribution from their paychecks.  In addition, none of the maquilas
investigated by Human Rights Watch had the daycare facilities that are legally required for
employers with more than 30 female workers.
E.2. Failure to Apply Maximum Hours of Work Laws to Domestic Workers 
The 2002 Human Rights Watch study also revealed that “in Guatemala, domestic
workers are excluded from core, nationally-recognized labor rights.”  The Labor Code does not
give domestic workers the right to an 8-hour workday, minimum wage, or a written employment
contract. Domestic workers are supposed to receive a card that lists their first day of work and
salary, but this often does not happen.  The Ministry of Labor therefore does not even have a
record of how many domestic workers there are in Guatemala or what their average wages and
hours are.  The domestic workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch averaged 90 hours of
work per week and earned a monthly salary of approximately 96 dollars.  
52 ICFTU Report for the WTO, supra n. 34, p. 5.
53 Global March Against Child Labor, 2002 Report on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, p. 94.
54 2001 Country Report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices, Feb. 2002, p. 8.
55 Human Rights Watch, supra n. 46.
 
56 AFL-CIO Petition to the USTR, August 2000.
57 ICFTU Report for the WTO, supra n. 34, p. 5.




Guatemalan law allows sentences of forced prison labor for individuals who participate
in illegal strikes, other labor violations, or communist agitation, or for public servants that fail to
complete their duties.  The International Labor Organization has criticized this legislation and
recommended that it be amended.52
G. Child Labor
The Guatemalan government has failed to sufficiently address the endemic problem of
child labor.  Guatemala has the second-highest rate of child exploitation in Latin America, after
Ecuador.53 Indeed, Carmen Moreno, the regional coordinator of the ILO’s International Program
on the Elimination of Child Labor, explained in May 2002 that, with respect to child labor, “the
Central American country that causes greatest concern is Guatemala.”  In 2000, MINUGUA
found that 34% of children between the ages of 7 and 14 were working.  Moreover, the U.S.
Department of State reported in 2002 that Guatemalan child workers generally do not receive
social benefits, insurance, vacations, severance pay, or minimum-wage salaries.54  Additionally,
while the law says that children may not work more than 7 hours daily, this does not apply to
those who are domestic workers.55
The government also fails to protect these children from the hazards of particular
industries.  Many child laborers work in particularly dangerous jobs, and health and safety
standards are non-existent.  Between 3,000 and 5,000 children work in the illegal fireworks
industry, which directly exposes them to highly toxic, flammable and explosive materials.56 
Involvement in the fireworks industry “is responsible for numerous deaths and serious injuries of
working children each year,” according to the ICFTU.57  Also, approximately 20% of prostitutes
are under age 15, and 60% are between ages 16 and 18.58  The U.S. Department of State Country
Report on Human Rights Practices estimated that 80% of work accidents involve 15 to 18 year
old workers who lack proper safety training.59
60 See CEACR: Individual Observations Concerning Convention No. 81, Honduras 2002.
61 See CEACR: Individual Observations Concerning Convention No. 87, Honduras 2002; ICFTU
2002 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: Honduras.
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III. HONDURAS
 In Honduras, anti-union dismissals are frequent when workers attempt to organize. 
Moreover, child labor is a problem in rural areas, the informal sector, and some export
agriculture.  A recent ILO report found that 490,000 Honduran children were working in 2002. 
Another study estimated that 97,000 children between the ages of 10 and 14 had left school to
work.  Child labor in its worst forms also exist; children are exposed to dangerous conditions on
lobster boats, where they dive illegally with little safety protection, and on melon farms, where
they are exposed to toxic pesticides.  
In response to clear evidence of its failure to meet the GSP worker rights criteria, the
Government of Honduras agreed in 1995 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), as a means of demonstrating its commitment
going forward to better implement internationally recognized worker rights.  Unfortunately, in
recent years, the Honduran Government has failed to make significant progress toward the terms
of the MOU, and moreover, the USTR has neglected to undertake the dialogue necessary to
ensure future progress under this agreement.  The MOU has clearly been an insufficient
instrument to ensure better protection for worker rights in Honduras.
In the first place, we note that the terms of the MOU are in and of themselves insufficient
to guarantee full implementation of the internationally recognized worker rights.  The document
is oriented solely toward workers in export processing industries.  On the subject of legal reform,
the MOU discusses only two possible changes to the labor code.  As we note below, several
additional reforms would be needed to fully guarantee the right to associate.
We recognize that the MOU proved useful in bringing about some immediate changes in
the few years following its signature.  However, we note with concern that at least since 2000,
there have been no additional steps taken to ensure full implementation of the terms of the MOU. 
For example, the MOU commits the Honduran government to improve the training of labor
inspectors, and to increase the frequency of inspections.  Local trade union leaders have found
that neither of these terms has yet been adequately met.  The MOU also commits the
Government of Honduras to combat corruption among labor inspectors.  On this point, the ILO
has noted on several occasions, most recently in mid-2002, that the Honduran Government has
not yet provided adequate legal provisions that would provide redress against corrupt inspectors,
or otherwise prohibit legally corrupt or partial behavior by inspectors.60  
We note also that Honduran laws are not yet in full compliance with ILO standards,
particularly with respect to freedom of association.  The law requires a minimum of 30 workers
to form a trade union, and prohibits the existence of more than one union in a single workplace. 
It bans the calling of strikes by union federations or confederations.  Moreover the law provides
insufficient penalties for acts of anti-union discrimination.61  The fine in such cases is
62 See CEACR: Individual Observations Concerning Convention No. 98, Honduras 2002.
63 Complaint Against the Government of Honduras Presented by International Textile, Garment
and Leather Workers Federation, ILO Report 325, Case No. 2100.
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approximately US$12, an amount grossly insufficient to deter employers from engaging in such
acts.62
Nor has the government acted to effectively enforce its protections for union rights.  Two
well-known cases of union discrimination in the maquila sector, the cases of Yoo Yang and Kimi
factories, were the subject of an ILO complaint last year.63  Again, the ILO found insufficient
action on the part of the Honduran government to ensure the protection of rights in these cases. 
Despite language in the MOU committing the Honduran government to expedite the union
registration process and thereby to alleviate situations where workers seeking to join the union
were fired in the period awaiting registration, the Honduran government delayed registration of
the Yoo Yang union for several months.  The Ministry of Labor failed to provide information
regarding the rejection of the initial registration request in a timely manner, thus forcing the
union to resubmit its documentation and recommence the process.  Almost three months after the
statutory deadline, the Ministry of Labor finally informed the Yoo Yang union that the renewed
application had been denied on technical grounds.  After a lengthy delay, the union was finally
recognized in late 2000, but the ILO has opined that the lengthy delay in registration may
constitute a violation of the right to associate.
Finally, we note our concern with the widespread problem of child labor in Honduras,
particularly in the agricultural sector.  The ILO and local NGOs have estimated that
approximately 350,000 Honduran children are engaged in work outside the home, and an
additional 140,000 engage in domestic labor.  Despite legal reforms and the government’s recent
ratification of ILO Convention No. 182, it is estimated that the levels of child labor have actually
risen since 1998.  This indicates that the Honduran government has not been effective in
enforcing laws governing child labor.
Accordingly, we urge the US Trade Representative to revisit the terms of the MOU and
to also raise these obligations with Honduras during the CAFTA negotiations.  The MOU itself
has clearly been insufficient to bring about progress to revise labor laws that do not yet conform
with ILO standards, to provide meaningful penalties for non-compliance with those laws, and to
provide effective and impartial inspection of workplaces to ensure enforcement of those laws.
IV. NICARAGUA
A. Overview and Background 
Currently, there are thirty-four companies operating in Nicaragua’s state-sponsored Free
Trade Zone (FTZ), employing over 30,000 workers; there are several more companies operating
in each of the four private-sector Free Trade Zones.  The International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) has documented that only 3% of the total workforce within the FTZs are
unionized, largely because of government-sanctioned, employer hostility and the overall
weaknesses of the labor code.  Despite national laws recognizing freedom of association and
64 Fourth Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
Prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (hereinafter “2001 USTR
Report”) at 50-52. 
65 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2002: Nicaragua
(hereinafter “2002 State Dept. Report”); 2001 USTR Report.
66 2002 State Dept. Report; 2001 USTR Report. 
67 2002 State Dept. Report; ICFTU 2002 Nicaragua: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade
Union Rights (hereinafter “2002 ICFTU Report”). 
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collective bargaining, employers continue to thwart unionization efforts and blacklist union
leaders and organizers.  The outcome is that Nicaraguan workers are subject to abysmal working
conditions akin to, in some cases, modern-day slavery.
The recent reports about Nicaragua confirm that many workers, in violation of national
law, are: forced to perform unpaid overtime, verbally and physically harassed by their
supervisors, denied adequate breaks, forced to undergo monitored bathroom visits, subjected to
forced pregnancy testing, and continually exposed to hazardous working conditions.  Labor
leaders also confirm that despite the protections of the labor code, the laws are not applied in
practice within and without the FTZs.  Indeed, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, in its
2001 report to Congress, recognized the problems although it nevertheless recommended that
Nicaragua continue to receive benefits under the Carribean Basin Economic Recovery Act.64
B. Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under Articles 45 and 48 of Nicaragua’s labor code, employers can fire union organizers
by simply paying them double the normal severance pay.  The U.S. State Department recognized
in their most recent report that allows employers to thwart attempts to unionize by simply firing
the organizers.65  The labor code also recognizes employer-created cooperatives and/or unions,
which often displace existing employee-created unions.  These cooperatives generally do not
permit strikes and have inadequate grievance procedures leaving workers with little protection
from unlawful labor practices.  The labor code provides no guidance on how these cooperatives
or employer-created unions are to co-exist with independent employee unions. Often, the
employer is able to negotiate solely with these cooperatives and declare that they have met with
their obligation to bargain collectively.
The right to bargain collectively is also significantly impaired by the practical inability to
strike.66 Although the labor code recognizes the right to strike, unions are unable to exercise this
right because the process to obtain permission for a legal strike is lengthy and complex.67  The
labor ministry asserts that it would take approximately six months for a union to go through the
entire process to have a legal strike.  In order to call a legal strike, the labor code requires that
there be a majority vote of all the workers in an enterprise, good faith negotiation with
management, and approval by the Labor Ministry.  Since the 1996 labor code reform, there have
only been three legal strikes under this arduous process.  Instead, unions, as the example below
68 2002 State Dept. Report
69 The Chentex factory, located in Nicaragua’s Las Mercedes FTZ, is one of the many factories
operated by Taiwan-based Nien Hsing Denim Company.  Taiwanese factories employ a large
number of workers in the FTZs; Chentex alone employs over 1,700 workers.  Taiwan also enjoys
tremendous influence with the Nicaraguan government, as it funded the construction of the
foreign ministry and refurbished the presidential palace and the national assembly building. 
 
The information provided on the Chentex organizing campaign was obtained from
numerous sources including the State Dept. Human Rights Report for 2002 and the ICFTU 2002
Annual Report, as well as Gonzalez, David.  “Nicaragua’s Trade Zone: Battleground for
Unions,” NY Times, September 16, 2000; Michael Ratner, Labor Rights, Free Trade Zones &
The Chentex Struggle in Nicaragua ( www.humanrightsnow.org); U.S./LEAP, “Chentex Worker
Struggle,” 4/19/01. ( www.usleap.org/Chentex.html); Clean Clothes Campaign, “Unions and
the Chentex Factory in Nicaragua” ( www.cleanclothes.org/urgent/01-04-10.htm); and Fonseca,
Roberto, “Labor Conflict Highlights EPZ Firms’ Importance,” Inst. for Policy Studies, July 24,
1998.
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demonstrates, have been forced to forgo the protections of a legal strike and opt for illegal
strikes, where they are then subject to dismissal and other reprisals.  The U.S. State Department
has also directly noted that “in essence, employers have taken advantage of the extensive
administrative requirements required to declare a strike legal and have subsequently been able to
fire union leaders and organizers.”68 
B.1. Chentex
The Chentex organizing campaign, which ultimately resulted in the termination of over
700 members of the union, is perhaps the most recent and best-documented evidence of
Nicaragua’s failure to enforce local labor laws with regard to freedom of association and
collective bargaining.69  In April 2000, representatives of the CST (Sandinista Workers Central)
at Chentex tried to obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor of go on strike after trying
for 9 months to negotiate wage increases.  The CST simply wanted to increase the minimum
salary in the factory from $62 to $115/month (still below the government’s estimate for the cost
of a basic basket of goods).  The CST was ultimately unable to obtain authorization from the
Labor Ministry despite documented efforts over 9 months to negotiate with Chentex.  Following
a 2-day unauthorized strike, union leaders were dismissed as well as about 700 other union
members with the express approval of the Labor Ministry.  When the CST appealed the
dismissals, Chentex and labor officials maintained that the dismissals were justified because the
leaders did not consult the employees before calling the strike and had attempted to sabotage the
factory. 
Only through pressure by local groups and an international campaign, including pressure
by the U.S. government, did the Court of Appeals order the reinstatement (with back pay) of
nine union leaders who had been fired in June 2000.  The remaining hundreds of employees
were left unprotected under Nicaragua law, which only provides immunity for up to thirteen
union leaders at any given enterprise.  By May 10, 2001, an agreement was signed wherein
70 Obtained from an interview with Maura Parsons through the Nicaragua Information Network
(NicaNet) available at:  www.nicanet.org.
71 Movimiento de Mujeres María Elena Cuadra, Diagnóstico: Avances y Retrocesos: Mujeres en
las Maquilas de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua, 2002 (hereinafter Maria Elena Cuadra 2002
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Chentex reinstated four union leaders and seventeen other union members and further agreed to
drop a lawsuit demanding the dissolution of the union.
However, as Maura Parsons, one of the four reinstated union officers, explained,
“reinstatement” proved to be merely a symbolic attempt to respect worker rights.70  Upon arrival
at Chentex, Parsons and the three other officers were told that they could not speak with any of
the workers and would be treated as new employees with no union leader immunity.   By May
18, 2001, eight days after the reinstatement, Chentex fired eight workers simply for talking to
Parsons.  Further, Chentex received approval from the Labor Ministry to fire an additional 20
workers whom Chentex believed were sympathetic to the union officers.  Chentex thereafter
fired four to seven workers per day under the auspices of possible work instability at the factory.
Ultimately, Parsons and the other officers were forced to resign on June 13, 2001, just one month
after reinstatement.  Now, the union, originally formed with over 400 workers, is no longer
active at Chentex because the membership fell below the 20-worker minimum.
In addition to Chentex, several other unions have had their registrations withdrawn by the
labor ministry due to employer pressure, and union members continue to be fired without just
cause.  This activity clearly violates Articles 231-234 of the Labor Code, which prohibit the
firing of union leaders.  Current examples, but by no means all, based on recent information
from our partners in Nicaragua, include: the cancellation of union registrations and dismissal of
union leaders at the Chih Hsing garment factory, the dismissal of the entire union leadership and
several members at Cupid Foundations, the cancellation of the registration and dismissal of the
leaders of the Sol de Libertad union at Formosa Textile SA, the dismissal of the leadership and
suspension of 789 workers 4 months at Chu Hsin, the dismissal of the union leaders on
December 13, 2001 at Dasol Textil,  the suspension of the labor contracts of 62 workers at Won
Mi Embro Printing Co.
C. Forced Labor
The Nicaraguan labor code mandates an 8 hour work day totaling a 48 hour work week
over six days.  Anything over these hours is considered overtime and the employer is required to
pay the employee twice his or her regular pay, and if the employer is late with this amount an
extra 10% of that amount.  Despite the provisions of the labor code, there is continued evidence
of forced overtime without pay amounting to forced or compulsory labor. 
As reported in the 2002 State Department Report, Nicaraguan labor ministers
documented that in one textile factory, 34 workers worked a total of 27 hours from 7:00 am one
day until 10 am the following day and were provided with only a piece of bread and a bottle of
soda during the night.  These unremunerated workers stated that they agreed to work these hours
because they felt they would be fired otherwise.  A 2002 study conducted by Maria Elena
Cuadra Women’s Movement of 4,770 women working in 17 different companies in the FTZ also
revealed that approximately 50% of the women worked more than 9 extra hours each week.71 
Study).
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Additionally, Nicaragua remains a source for trafficking women and children, mostly for
purposes of sexual exploitation.72 Once trafficked, they are forced into sexual slavery in order to
work off transportation fees and additional debts, and control is maintained through violence,
threats, restriction of outside earnings, and at times even through physical restraint.73  In the case
of Nicaragua, researchers documented cases of trafficking to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala
and Belize with promises of jobs in hotels, domestic workers, and factory workers.74  Despite
Nicaragua’s legal prohibitions, few cases have been reported and investigated due to weaknesses
in the justice system.75
D. Child Labor
The latest official figures estimate that approximately 292,488 children are employed in
Nicaragua, and that child labor continues to be a problem due to ineffective government
enforcement of its laws.76  A 1998 UNICEF report, however, estimates that as many as 42% of
children between ages 6-9 were working.  Nicaraguan law prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 14, and parental permission is required for children to work from ages 15-17. 
Child labor that can affect normal childhood development or interfere with the school year is
prohibited by the Constitution and children are not allowed to be employed in mines and garbage
dumps at any age. 
Nevertheless, children continue to work in rural areas on coffee, tobacco, rice and banana
plantations where they are exposed to ultrahazardous chemicals.  In urban areas, they are found
working on the streets, cleaning automobiles, selling merchandise, and often times, selling
themselves through prostitution as the only means of income.  In the last study conducted by
UNICEF in 1998, 40 % of the 1,200 prostitutes in the city were under the age of 18.  In 1999, the
ministry of Family also found that 82% of the 300 children interviewed had engaged in some
form of prostitution. 
E. Conditions of Work
In addition to the violations discussed above, a 2001 study conducted by Maria Elena
Cuadra revealed that of 1,500 workers surveyed, as many as 59.23% had not received protective
equipment or clothing and, of the small group of workers who did, approximately 20% of them
77 Movimiento de Mujeres María Elena Cuadra. Diagnóstico: Condiciones de Salud e Higiene
Ocupacional Trabajadoras en las Maquilas. Managua, Nicaragua, 2001. 
78 Maria Elena Cuadra 2002 Study. 
79 Id. 
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were forced to pay for the protective equipment.77  The study also noted that 75.76% of the
workers were forced to spend more than 8 hours on their feet.  By the year 2002, the situation
had not improved as noted in a subsequent study by the Maria Elena Cuadra group which found
that 54% of the 4,770 workers interviewed had suffered illness, lesions or other health problems
caused by inadequate safety and health mechanisms at their place of work.78  As many as 45%
also said there were no air ventilators in their workplace and approximately half of the workers
had be subjected to verbal violence or psychological pressure in the workplace.79
V. COSTA RICA
Costa Rica is one of the most anti-union countries in the Americas and routinely violates
the right of workers to freely associate.  Only 15% of the Costa Rican work force belongs to a
union, and, of that number, 80% are in the public sector.  Currently, the greatest impediment to
free association in Costa Rica is the use of “solidarity associations,” which are favored by the
employers. Such associations are incapable of exerting a threat to the employer because they do
not enjoy the right to strike.  Indeed, employers use these organizations as cover to avoid its
obligation to bargaining collectively with unions by instead negotiating with the solidarity
associations. 
 
Among those who do have the right to strike, they are excessively restricted by an
absence of legal guidance and a hostile judicial system.  For example, while strikes are allowed
in the public sector so long as a judge determines that a strike would not effect essential services,
no criteria exists to determine which sectors belong to this category.  In the past 50 years, only
two strikes have been declared legal.  Indeed, after a visit to Costa Rica in September 2001, the
ILO confirmed that it is almost impossible to carry out legal strikes.
Moreover, judicial processes that should protect the rights of union workers are slow and
ineffective.  In 1999, 70.6% of the cases dealing with unfair dismissals took longer than the two-
month maximum limit.  Even if the case is decided in the worker’s favor, there is no legal
mechanism for a judge to force a private-sector employer to reinstate an unjustly fired worker.
Recently, the GSP Subcommittee rejected for review the petition submitted by the AFL-
CIO to suspend trade preferences for Costa Rica.  Given the abundant evidence that Costa Rica
does not respect internationally recognized worker rights, as set forth in that petition, we urge the
USTR to reconsider its decision and to conduct a full investigation into the failure of Costa Rica
to meet all of the conditions necessary for participation in the GSP program.  Moreover, the
issues raised in the petition must be addressed directly and vigorously during the upcoming
CAFTA negotiations with the government of Costa Rica.
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A MODEST PROPOSAL
The country profiles depict clearly a near total disregard for the internationally
recognized workers rights set forth in our trade laws.  Therefore, the International Labor Rights
Fund, on behalf of our partners in Central America, strongly urges the USTR to negotiate for and
obtain an enforceable labor rights clause in CAFTA.  Sustained economic development will
elude a vast majority of the populations of the Central American countries without such a
mechanism.
It is essential that any proposal to unite the region in a trade agreement with the U.S.
must incorporate a concrete program to improve labor rights enforcement in the body of the
agreement.  Apart from the need to enforce labor laws because they reflect normative standards
that deserve respect, the promised benefit of free trade is economic development.  This will not
occur if developing countries are forced to compete against one another to attract new
investment by offering cheap labor and non-enforcement of national laws. This dynamic of
reverse development will lower living standards for all workers.  Rather, a major objective of a
free trade agreement should be to provide a floor for labor standards to prevent a company from
fleeing to a neighboring country to avoid compliance.  The challenge is to provide adequate
incentives for countries to cooperate in obtaining compliance with labor laws. 
The complex issue of encouraging compliance with labor laws requires a dual strategy.
First, there must be a focus on evaluating the current labor laws of each country, identifying
issues of labor law reform that would be necessary to improve the standards and the enforcement
process, and assessing the barriers to enforcement, including resources.  Second, there must
ultimately be some process to allow for remedies in the event of systematic non-compliance.
With respect to the first issue, there should be relatively little controversy.  Despite a few
exceptions, every country in Central America has domestic labor laws or has ratified
international instruments, including ILO Conventions, that already bind them to comply with the
standards that most experts consider to be the essential or core labor rights.  Thus, there should
be little debate as to whether the countries of Central America have already accepted their
obligation to enforce labor rights.  There remains thus the process of identifying specific issues
that are not adequately addressed by current domestic laws, and developing specific labor law
reform proposals for each of the countries to accomplish the key first step of ensuring that the
laws of all of the countries adequately protect labor rights. 
The next step then is to identify objective barriers to enforcement.  In some cases, the
barrier will be a lack of resources, including the need to upgrade skills of the enforcing agencies
and courts.  In other cases, it will be a conscious decision not to enforce the laws. These
decisions may have several explanations, including the inability to address the financial
consequences of better enforcement, the desire to attract investment by promoting the country as
light on enforcement, or the intent to benefit the elites of the countries who own the majority of
factories and plantations.  It is this situation that presents the greatest challenge.  
If non-enforcement is due to a lack of resources to absorb the increased costs of
compliance, such is a legitimate problem that proponents of a free trade agreement must address.
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For example, if the laws prohibiting child labor are not being enforced, and a specific country
lacks the resources to move a large number of child laborers into productive education programs,
this presents a resource challenge for the entire system.  There may also be other laws, including
wage and hour laws, health and safety regulations, and other laws regulating the conditions of
work that are directly related to an increase in costs for the country. If proponents can make any
credible claim about respect for worker rights, there must resources allocated to ensure that the
national administrative system is functioning 
Initially, there should be a compliance survey undertaken in each country, something that
could be undertaken by the ILO.  Through this process, cost issues could be identified, and each
country could develop a plan that would provide a reasonable period to upgrade their labor laws
and enforcement mechanisms and to estimate the fund necessary to pay for compliance. Of
course, the countries themselves should raise some of the funds as an investment in their own
infrastructure. Since the U.S. government seeks to make “free trade” with Central America a
priority, it must also make resources available to ensure that labor rights are not sacrificed in the
process.  Otherwise, it would ultimately undermine any credible claim that CAFTA is a plan for
sustainable economic development.  Indeed, what better way to invest in poverty eradication
than to improve rights for workers and the conditions under which they work. 
With respect to barriers to enforcement based on a conscious decision not to enforce
labor laws, either in an effort to attract investment or to benefit local elites, a different approach
is necessary. At a minimum, there must be a concerted effort to make clear that non-enforcement
is not an option, and that sanctions would follow refusal to enforce the laws. This is a challenge
of both changing the status quo and creating political will.  Ultimately, some institution created
by the free trade agreement must be available to provide remedies in the event of systematic
failure by any single government to enforce the labor laws.  Concerns about loss of national
sovereignty will need to be addressed, but if the process of upgrading labor laws is done
properly, then the focus could remain on enforcing national laws, and would only offer the
option of super-national enforcement in the event of demonstrated non-enforcement by the
specific government.
The key elements of a workable enforcement mechanism to apply upon the failure of a
national enforcement system can be easily stated, though the details would need to be worked
out in a negotiation process.  First and foremost, any enforcement process must be democratic
and transparent. A major criticism of the WTO enforcement panels is that they are closed to the
public and operate in secrecy.  The legitimacy of any system that will in essence override
national enforcement systems is that the system is unassailable on procedural grounds. All
processes involving enforcement must be fully transparent, including a written public record of
all proceedings and open hearings.  There also needs to be a clear appeals process. 
 Second, access to the enforcement process must be available to all interested parties, not
just the government signatories to the trade agreement. The key constituency here is the workers
themselves, most of whom are not currently represented by a trade union. They must have direct
access to an enforcement process. Also, other stakeholders, such as NGOs and labor
organisations, must have access to the process.  
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Third, the enforcement process must make a distinction between violations that are
attributable to private actors, including multinationals, and therefore require remedies more in
the line of penalties, and those that are attributable to governments, and might be better
addressed by trade sanctions.  Penalties directed at companies, with the cooperation of the host
government, will resolve most problems. This also leaves problem solving within the firm
control of the individual governments and allows them to act to prevent any protectionist use of
the enforcement process.  If a country ultimately refuses to enforce its own laws, as per the
commitment made in its own laws and the international standards, there must be a system of
penalties to encourage compliance, with the ultimate sanction being exclusion from the benefits
of the trade agreement.  It seems fair and appropriate that the benefits should not be available if a
country fails to comply with the underlying commitment to enforce its own labor laws.
